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Introduction 
After period of considerable anxiety in some sections of the British press about an apparent 
absence, UK Prime Minister, David Cameron unveiled the UK government’s plans to mark 
the centenary of the World War One in a speech at the Imperial War Museum in London in 
October 2012. He argued it was crucial to commemorate the ‘Great War’ due to ‘the 
extraordinary sacrifice of a generation’ and the considerable impact of a conflict that 
‘changed our nation’ and the world more widely. His ambition was, he claimed, to recognise 
the durable emotional connection of the conflict through the development of ‘a truly 
national commemoration’ whilst also seeking to acknowledge the sacrifice of ‘friends in the 
Commonwealth’ and from across all of Ireland.
1
 
Centenary commemorations have however proven increasingly open to public contention, 
revealing tensions and divergence between politicians, academics, and other commentators 
with regards to the thematic justification, coherence, and purpose of the United Kingdom 
(UK) government’s plans. This article seeks to explore some of these tensions, particularly 
the extent to which a ‘politics of war commemoration’ is founded on ideologically-driven 
disputes regarding how the First World War is remembered. It will also assess the historical 
and contemporary challenges to establishing ‘national’ narratives and memory cultures to 
mark the First World War centenary that are inclusive and yet recognise diversity in how the 
conflict is remembered across UK and across its former empire. This will be realised by 
considering how multi-nationality and transnationality have problematised the UK 
government’s aspirations, as Cameron asserted, for the centenary of World War One to 
capture ‘our national spirit’. 
 
The Politics of War Commemoration 
The deaths of the last surviving British combatants and the centenary of the First World War 
have initiated considerable political, academic and public deliberation about the causes, 
conduct, and legacies of the conflict, and the potential lessons to be learnt. Intense debate 
has highlighted the complex and ever-increasing interactions between and 
interdependencies of history and memory. According to Jay Winter (2006), since the end of 
the First World War, the position of historians as the primary mediators of nationhood 
through the articulation of national history has been gradually superseded by at least two 
‘memory booms’ widely embraced by nation-states and their citizens alike. Emergent 
memory cultures have stimulated public discourse and transformed how past events are 
remembered, interpreted and articulated. Winter argues the initial ‘memory boom’ was a 
response to the trauma of the First World War and sought to fortify and elevate national 
identities in an imperial age through war commemoration projects. However he believes 
that a second ‘memory boom’ emerged in late 1960s, founded on revisionist approaches 
that fractured national ideological and cultural frameworks of collective war remembrance. 
Winter’s ‘memory boom’ thesis is important in developing understanding of the centrality of 
the First World War in shaping contemporary approaches to war commemoration. As 
‘collective’ national forms of memory are intimately connected with the present, they are 
susceptible to instrumentalisation, manipulation and politicisation. This is, according to 
Pierre Nora (2011), increasingly realised through on-going public debate about the content 
and purpose of history in which historians have been peripheralised. While history was once 
a political activity that supported the nation, it has become politicised in sustaining 
divergent ideological constructions of the present. These so-called ‘history’ or ‘memory’ 
wars have become a persistent feature of public discourse in many states including the UK, 
and are typically linked to broader politicised debates about political, social, economic and 
cultural citizenship and identity. They reveal a shared belief amongst protagonists that 
states have the potential to articulate and inculcate homogenous collective identities 
founded on particularistic interpretations of the national past. 
How past conflicts are interpreted and commemorated is a significant element of these 
emotionally charged debates, providing reference points for complementary or 
contradictory forms of memory and identity that underline political and cultural tensions 
between individuals and groups within and amongst nation-states.
 
War commemoration is 
therefore primarily a political project whereby the state and its institutions mediate and 
order formal and informal collective memories and histories. The promotion of a 
homogenous national identity that references important conflicts is seen to establish 
symbolic continuity between the past, present and future of a nation-state (Ashplant, 
Dawson and Roper 2004).This process is inherently multilateral, and is thus both 
contentious and contested. Politicised disputes over the interpretation, framing and 
articulation of past conflicts and their commemoration by public institutions such as 
museums, universities and schools are often febrile and also counter-intuitive as they 
enhance division rather than solidarity. This is, in part, because ‘official’ forms of war are 
typically founded on dominant or hegemonic state-approved historical narratives that seek 
to preserve and reinforce particular elites and ideologies. Consequently they are seen by 
opponents as reflecting and reproducing unequal power relations shaped by phenomena 
such as race, ethnicity, class, gender and other social hierarchies (Graff-McRae, 2010).  
Such debates therefore often hinge on the extent to which protagonists believe state-led 
war commemoration should be founded on ‘orthodox’ or revisionist reinterpretations of 
past conflicts. Such challenges reveal schisms about whether war commemoration should 
seek inculcate positive collective forms of patriotism or more critical and pluralist 
interpretations. For example, popular responses to how past conflicts are remembered can 
often be allied with expressions of grief and mourning of traumatic loss that challenge 
attempts by states to promote more celebratory approaches to war commemoration 
(Marshall, 2004). War commemoration of past conflicts is also contextual and liable to re-
interpretation by subsequent generations.  
 
Historical Approaches to commemorating the First World War 
Complexities relating to history, memory and war commemoration raise significant 
challenges with regards to the stated aims of the UK government centenary plans. One of 
the most pressing questions relates to what is actually being commemorated during the 
centenary and why. As the conflict came to an end, the British state was proactive in seeking 
to mediate the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ collective memories to shape commemoration of 
First World War. This involved the ‘invention’ of national forms of commemoration involving 
repetitive mass public participation in rituals, ceremonies and memorials, together with the 
dissemination of state-sponsored narratives concerning the conflict in museums and mass 
education programmes.  But official and unofficial forms of commemoration of World War 
One have proven neither static nor universal in terms of participation or meaning. While the 
inter-war and immediate period after World War Two saw significant numbers involved in 
acts of war commemoration, public participation slowly declined in the latter half of the 20
th
 
century. However, the gradual dying out of the First World War generation, a series of 
significant conflict anniversaries, and the engagement of the UK in a series of conflicts have 
encouraged greater public recognition and participation in war commemoration (Shaw, 
1997).  
Participation in British First World War commemoration has been motivated by diverse 
narratives emphasising an (appropriately respectful) patriotic acknowledgement of the 
positive contribution of militarily action, a futile and terrible warning of the dangers of war, 
or even a call for world peace. Mosse notes concerted efforts undertaken by the British 
state after the war sought to justify the fighting and sacrifice through the promotion of 
patriotic national myths and commemorative acts and rituals ‘to make an inherently 
unpalatable past acceptable’ (Mosse, 1990). This was driven by a need to justify the scale of 
losses in the war in the name of the British nation and empire, not least so that others might 
risk their lives in future wars. While the sense of shock regarding the scale of loss of life has 
proven durable, the precise nature of the cause for which combatants died has proven open 
to reinterpretation (Todman, 2005). More positive conceptions of the World War One that 
celebrated victory, prominent in the inter-war period, have largely dissipated in the wake of 
the Second World War. Since the 1960s, many Britons have been strongly influenced by 
revisionist accounts that construe World War One as a largely futile conflict in which the 
huge loss of life was the result of political and military elite incompetence. State forms of 
war commemoration have reflected this more sombre revisionist tone.  
 
The First World ‘History’ Wars 
Tensions between state and popular perceptions of how World War One is now understood 
and remembered have been evident in UK government pronouncements regarding their 
centenary plans and the ensuing debate. The special representative for the Centenary 
Commemoration of the First World War, Andrew Murrison MP, has stated commemorations 
would focus on remembrance, thus ‘making no judgment about fault, right or wrong, or 
indulging in any jingoistic sentiment’. He acknowledged ‘there are bound to be differences 
of opinion about how the Great War is remembered’, but argued ‘it would be wrong for the 
government to insist on a particular narrative’.
2
 The dominant themes underpinning 
contributions of politicians of differing ideological hues have often reiterated established 
revisionist themes regarding poor political and military leadership and the scale of human 
loss. This has been linked to a perceived need to avoid celebratory or jingoistic overtones in 
remembering the conflict.
3 
 
But heated debates between politicians, historians, and the media more widely have 
highlighted that political ideology is an instrumental factor in framing the history, memory 
and commemoration of the conflict. For some on the political right have sought to actively 
counter revisionist themes disseminated by ‘Marxist’ historians since the 1960s that have 
skewed public perceptions of the conflict. UK Secretary of State for Education, Michael 
Gove, claimed that the ‘existing left-wing version of the past’ had strongly influenced British 
popular culture but were founded on myths deliberately designed to ‘belittle Britain and its 
leaders’.
4
 Others from the political right, such as UK Independence Party leader, Nigel 
Farage, and Conservative London Mayor, Boris Johnson, concurred with Gove’s analysis, 
with the latter denouncing the ‘intellectual dishonesty of the left’.
5
 
Such comments provoked a furious response from politicians and historians alike. Richard 
Evans, Regius Professor of History at the University of Cambridge, forcefully drew attention 
to the work of a number of ‘right-wing’ historians who were also critical of British military 
leadership.
6
 Martin Pugh argued the centenary commemoration plans were a product of ‘a 
selected bunch of conservative historians and generals’, offering a ‘blinkered’ focus of the 
Western Front without recognising the radical impact of the First World War on British 
society.
7
 Labour MP and historian, Tristram Hunt, agreed, noting the significant social and 
political implications of the war in terms of class, gender, and British global power. He also 
declared Gove sought to ‘sow political division’ by rewriting the history of the war and to 
shift focus for its complex causes onto Germany alone.
8
  
Boris Johnson responded by demanding Hunt’s resignation, accusing him of denying that 
German militarism ‘was at the root of the First World War’.
9
 His comments revealed a wider 
tension about the extent the British victory should be commemorated or actively 
celebrated, particularly in relation to Germany. A leading member of the UK government’s 
centenary advisory committee, Brigadier Sir Hew Strachan, argued the avoidance of a more 
stridently positive tone to the commemorations revealed ‘intent in government not to upset 
the Germans’.
10
 This view has been supported by some sections of the British media. For 
example, an editorial in The Times suggested the UK government policy would appear to be 
‘don’t mention we won the First World War’. It noted the Britain’s role in the war was 
‘essentially just’, being ‘a necessary military response that stopped aggression by an 
expansionist power’ which was ‘xenophobic and anti-democratic’.
11
 One commentator even 
made a case for ‘why we SHOULD upset the Germans’, arguing there was a ‘politically 
correct’ notion to ‘suit contemporary sympathies’ that it was ‘somehow insulting to the 
millions who died to suggest that it wasn’t all a monstrous waste of blood’. He concluded, 
‘give it long enough and we may find that we actually lost the Great War after all’.
12
  
Uncertainties about the ‘justness’ of British cause in the First World War have also 
permeated debate about how it has shaped contemporary society. Some, such as Hew 
Strachan, argue that the motivations of those who fought were of another age, suggesting 
they sought to defend the patriotic values of ‘strongly religious society’ which was deeply 
hierarchical and whose ‘collective loyalties’ were shaped by monarchy, empire, and 
nation.
13
 Politicians have however sought to relate the conflict to contemporary forms of 
patriotism and citizenship. For example, David Cameron has claimed that those who fought 
and died were defending ‘the values we hold dear’, though he struggled to articulate what 
these were beyond ‘friendship, loyalty, what the Australians would call ‘mateship’’.
14
 
Michael Gove proposed that those fighting in the First World War were driven by a desire to 
defend Britain’s ‘special tradition of liberty’ and ‘the western liberal order’.
15
  Richard Evans 
responded such claims were compromised by the British preparedness to form an alliance 
with authoritarian Tsarist Russia.
16
 Guardian columnist, Seamus Milne, went further, noting 
‘the idea that the war was some kind of crusade for democracy when most of Britain's 
population – including many men – were still denied the vote, and democracy and dissent 
were savagely crushed among most of those Britain ruled, is laughable’.
17
   
Some commentators have sought to link the First World War with contemporary political 
issues. For example, British right-wing Eurosceptics have identified the genesis of the 
European Union as a political ‘deception’ by elites who fought in the First World War and 
then sought to build a ‘United States of Europe’ in the wake of the Second World War 
(Booker 2014). Influential right-wing polemicist, Charles Moore (2014), has argued that 
opportunist socialists took advantage of the necessities of ‘total war’ to expand the power 
and influence of the state through nationalisation and welfarism. This, he insisted, had led 
to long-term economic and social decline, initiating a moral collapse by making the poorest 
reliant on the state. On the left of the political spectrum, historian John Newsinger argued 
that the centenary commemorations were an attempt by the ‘ruling class’ to foster ‘the 
spirit of Britishness’ to supress working-class ‘by mythologising a conflict of unimaginable 
horror’.
18
 For some commentators, the lessons of the ‘savage industrial slaughter’ pursued 
by ‘predatory imperial powers’ have not been learnt, indicating there is a significant threat 
of another global conflict between great powers of the 21
st
 century.
19
  This is, according to 
Frank Furedi (2014), due to the divisive legacies of the First World War that have 
fragmented the potential for a universal liberal framework of political, economic and 
cultural values and ideologies that might negate conflict within and between states.  
 
‘A truly national commemoration’? 
Debates about the centenary are further complicated in multi-national states like the UK 
where war commemoration can simultaneously draw on shared experiences of past 
conflicts involving all of nations within the overarching state but also highlight distinctive or 
divergent sub-state national forms of remembrance founded on contradictory constructions 
of official and unofficial history and memory. British war commemoration has been 
predominantly framed on mutually-inclusive narratives, rituals and symbols of 
remembrance involving all of the nations of the UK.
20
 However, the conflation of British and 
English narratives informing state war commemoration reveal ethno-national hierarchies 
that have often marginalised or overlooked non-English official and unofficial histories and 
memory cultures. Such ‘Anglo-myopia’ appears to have influenced the UK government’s 
approach to the centenary. For example, David Cameron has claimed the commemorations 
will draw on ‘our national spirit in every corner of the country’. However the vast majority of 
UK government funding for ‘national’ events and projects has been allocated to England. For 
example, a programme involving the battlefront visits for school children was claimed by 
one government minister to have the potential to ‘bind us together as a nation’, although 
funding was only made available to English schools.
21
 
The proposition of a universal ‘British’ experience of the First World War thus conceals 
multi-national asymmetries in ‘national’ forms of history, identity and memory informing 
war commemorations that are layered and interdependent but not necessarily 
homogenous. Scholars have explored the distinctive impact and legacy of World War One in 
Scottish and Welsh national terms, drawing attention to distinctive frontline and domestic 
experiences and, in the case of Scotland, the disproportionate human cost.
22
 But the 
changing political climate in the non-English nations of the UK, particularly since the 
creation of devolved parliaments in 1998, are clearly have an impact of the tone and focus 
of centenary commemoration plans. 
In Scotland, the election of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in 2011 to take sole control of 
the Scottish Parliament has encouraged a distinctive approach to the centenary, 
emphasising the Scottish nation rather than the UK more widely. In March 2013, the 
Scottish Government announced the formation of a Scottish advisory panel under the 
leadership of Norman Drummond who noted ‘it is important that Scotland remembers the 
sacrifice of those who served during the First World War and the wider impact that the war 
has had on our country and upon Scots across the world’.
23
 This noted, the Scottish 
government has drawn on a similar centenary narrative as the UK government, declaring it 
was in ‘no sense a celebration of the centenary of this devastating conflict’.
24
  
The forthcoming independence referendum in Scotland has provided a further dimension to 
debates about the centenary, although both pro- and anti-independence campaigns have 
formally signalled a ‘political armistice’.
25
 Supporters of Scottish independence have raised 
concerns about UK government’s ‘jingoistic celebrations’ of the ‘Great Slaughter’ of 
Scotland’s young who died because of ‘misplaced loyalty’.
26
 The greater ratio of Scots 
mortality rates on the Western Front when compared to other parts of the UK has been 
emphasised by Scottish nationalists, with one suggesting ‘British military commanders have 
always viewed Scottish forces as expendable’. A vote for independence would, he argued, 
ensure future generations of Scots could not be ‘sent like lambs to the slaughter for a 
monarch or a crusading Westminster zealot’.
27
 Historian Michael Fry concluded the 
centenary was part of a UK government-orchestrated and politicised ‘Britfest’ which began 
with the Diamond Jubilee and Olympics celebrations in 2012.
28
 
Conversely, those supporting the Union have argued the centenary provides ‘ample 
opportunity to remind the Scottish people how they stood together with the English, Welsh 
and Northern Irish’.
29
 Unionist politicians in both the Scottish and UK parliaments have 
accused the Scottish government of investing more funding in marking the 700
th
 anniversary 
of the Battle of Bannockburn, where the Scots defeated the English, whilst deliberately 
overlooking the centenary.
30
 Such an approach has been interpreted by one commentator 
as an attempt by the Scottish Government to appeal to the ‘inner nationalist’ of Scots rather 
than their ‘outer Brit’.
31
  
In Wales, commemoration plans for the centenary have similarly focused on Welsh national 
as well as British experiences but have proven less politicised than in Scotland. First 
Minister, Carwyn Jones, has noted, ‘it is extremely important that we remember those who 
died and reflect on how it changed Wales’.
32
 But Welsh nationalists have suggested that the 
centenary commemorations are ‘reminiscent of the jingoistic nonsense we saw from the 
British state elite to drum up support for the war in the first place’.
33
 One leading Plaid 
Cymru member has claimed that the origins of the Welsh independence movement can be 
located in World War One as a response to ‘British imperialism’ within the UK.
34
  
Commemoration of the First World War in Northern Ireland highlights most clearly the 
politically contentious and culturally divisive legacies of the First World War. The centenary 
is part of wider series of high-profile commemorations between 2012 and 2021 that mark 
events such as the Home Rule disputes, the Battle of Somme, the Easter Rising, and the Irish 
civil war that both draw attention to the contemporary resonances of historical events 
surrounding Ireland’s partition. The UK government has sought to extend established 
narratives underpinning the centenary to Northern Ireland that emphasise shared focus on 
British participation in the war – a theme that unionists politicians have keenly supported. 
For example, Theresa Villiers, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, has stated, ‘World 
War One profoundly affected the whole community across Northern Ireland and involved 
terrible sacrifice…..it is important that a century on, this generation recognises and pays 
tribute to those who gave so much for our country’.
35
 It has also indicated that centenary 
commemorations offer further opportunities for reconciliation with the Republic of Ireland, 
with UK government representatives stating they will reflect Irish involvement.
36
 However, 
the potential for ‘poppy wars’ to highlight enduring divisions across Ireland is significant.
37
 
While representatives of Sinn Fein have recently taken part in Remembrance Day services in 
Northern Ireland for the first time, dissident Republican groups have denounced the 
centenary of ‘a war of imperial conquest’.
38
 
 
World War One and the legacies of empire 
The role of Ireland in British centenary commemorations draws attention to the 
transnational dynamics of World War One. The contribution of its empire ensured British 
forms of war commemoration extended beyond the boundaries of the state to include 
former colonies that contributed soldiers and resources to previous conflicts. UK 
government representatives have sought to stress enduring Commonwealth ties, with David 
Cameron noting it was vital to recognise the ‘extraordinary sacrifice’ and ‘catastrophic’ 
death toll of ‘our friends in the Commonwealth’.
39
 This would appear to confirm Jay 
Winter’s (2006) proposition that, in the wake of the conflict, the ‘shadow of empire 
mattered’ in encouraging a sense of shared loss and trauma underpinning transnational 
networks of memory. Such networks were particularly resonant for the large numbers of 
Australians, Canadians, South Africans and New Zealanders in the so-called ‘White 
Dominions’, many of whom were British-born or who had British ancestry, thus indicating 
that imperial war commemoration was strongly defined by shared bonds which were often 
racially-determined.  
The centenary of the First World War has however revealed the extent to which post-
colonial revisionism in the wake of empire compromises dominant British national 
narratives and collective memories informing war commemoration. Although shared 
transnational modes of war commemoration across the ‘White Dominions’ have endured, 
the sacrifices of the First World War have become increasingly understood in terms of post-
British nation-building and progression towards self-determination. Historical narratives and 
memory cultures have thus drawn on postcolonial interpretations of the perceived British 
military incompetence and scepticism of the British political leaders who took the Empire to 
war. For example, the ‘legend’ or ‘myths’ of Australian and New Zealand Army Corps 
(ANZACs), particularly those troops involved in the Gallipoli landings of 1915, often 
emphasise perceived shared personal and group attributes and characteristics, such as 
courage, humour and ingenuity, and egalitarian values associated with ANZAC soldiers when 
compared to their British commanding officers and the ‘mother country’ more widely. Such 
mythology has been exposed to critical analysis (Wilson, 2012) but has have proven 
powerful in shaping public perceptions of the war in Australia and government plans for the 
centenary.
40
  
Suggestions by UK government ministers that the centenary offers opportunities to reflect 
on why ‘Britain and her family’ went to war reveal further tensions of empire.
41
 Many 
troops did enlist voluntarily, their actions underpinned by a confluence of domestic and 
broader imperial motives (Omissi, 2007). However a considerable number were conscripted 
and many lacked a comprehensive understanding of cause for which they were expected to 
fight.
42
 Many more imperial subjects supported the British war effort by providing resources 
and commodities – a contribution that is rarely acknowledged. Unlike their ‘White 
Dominion’ counterparts, transnational ‘collective memories’ informing the content of British 
war commemoration often overlooked the sacrifices of troops from the colonies and they 
not afforded equal recognition in remembrance on war memorials.
43
 
Although such ‘memory gaps’ were of particular resonance to those ‘new Commonwealth’ 
migrants who settled in the UK from the late 1940, the contribution of troops from the 
Indian sub-continent, Africa and the Caribbean has proven a growing dimension of war 
commemoration and the wider historiography of the First World War (Das, 2011). Indeed 
the UK government has sought to explicitly recognise the contribution of ethnic minority 
communities and the impact of the war on multicultural Britain. The First World War, 
according to David Cameron, marked ‘the beginnings of ethnic minorities getting the 
recognition, respect and equality they deserve’.
44
 As UK Faith and Communities Minister, 
Baroness Sayeeda Warsi has noted, ‘our boys weren’t just Tommies; they were Tariqs and 
Tajinders too’. She argued that centenary offered opportunities to acknowledge that ‘so 
many men from so far away came to Europe to fight for the freedoms we enjoy today. Their 
legacy is our liberty, and every single one of us owes them a debt of gratitude’.
45
  
The proposition that subjects from across the empire sought to defend British domestic 
liberties is highly-questionable though, particularly when considering the exploitative and 
hierarchical nature of British colonial rule. The post-war rewards for those from the colonies 
for fought were also scant and British rule remained largely unreformed in the inter-war 
period. Such claims also overlook the pervasive influence of racial categorisation and 
discrimination of troops from British colonies and other who supported the war effort. The 
experiences of those who served from the British dominions and colonies were profoundly 
different both in terms of experience. For example, while two Indian divisions fought on the 
Western Front, West Indian troops were not trusted and instead were allocated dangerous 
but menial manual labour.
46
 
There has been a failure to appreciate that debates about the legacies of the First World 
War are deeply entangled with those of British colonialism. Such an approach often 
overlooks the complex transnational dynamics of World War One commemoration or that 
the resonance and meaning of the conflict differs considerably across its former empire. For 
example, the history of the 1.3 million Indian soldiers who fought in the conflict has been 
largely forgotten in India, lost in the pursuit of independence after World War One and the 
subsequent framing of post-colonial Indian nationalism.
47
 How the First World War is 
commemorated across the Commonwealth is also not centrifugal in its relation to the 
experiences of the UK. The Australian government’s plans for the centenary 
commemoration focus on the strength of post-conflict ties with New Zealand and Turkey, 
highlighting shared sacrifice between them rather than the UK.    
Conclusions 
This article has argued that a ‘politics of war commemoration’, underpinned by tensions 
between official and unofficial collective memories and histories, have shaped public debate 
about the centenary of World War One. The UK government has claimed its role in the 
centenary was merely to provide leadership and encouragement in organising 
commemorative acts whilst not dictating the themes of commemoration itself. This 
position, though somewhat understandable, is naïve and overlooks its own role in 
stimulating ideologically-founded divisions concerning how the conflict should be 
commemorated and what are the legacies for contemporary British society. The UK 
government also appears unaware of the implications of seeking to realise its aspirations to 
host a ‘truly national commemoration’. By framing the First World War centenary in 
‘national’ terms, it has failed to fully acknowledge the extent to which the multi-national 
framework of the British state has and continues to layer and fragment war 
commemoration. Moreover there appears lack of recognition regarding the complex 
legacies of empire affect transnational forms of British war commemoration. The centenary 
has the power to (re)ignite a diverse range of postcolonial responses that impair the UK 
government’s proposition for a shared approach to the centenary across the 
Commonwealth. Therefore UK government’s plans for the commemoration of the First 
World War centenary have failed to fully recognise and sufficiently accommodate the 
complex and entangled memories and histories of the citizens and nations of the UK and its 
former empire. 
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